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Inclusion without solidarity:
Education, economic security, and attitudes towards redistribution
Abstract. Highly educated individuals tend to be less supportive of redistribution, by most
accounts because they have more to lose and less to gain from it. In this paper we use ESS data
to develop the argument that university education reduces support for redistribution in large
part independently of the improved material circumstances with which it is associated. While
university encourages a range of progressive ideas related to cultural inclusivity, it simultaneously
encourages conservative redistribution preferences that are reinforced - but only partly explained
- by the economic security it tends to provide. In short, European universities foster norms of
cultural inclusion, while simultaneously eroding norms of economic solidarity.
Keywords: Ideas, interests, education, university, redistribution, attitudes
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1 Introduction
It is a notable consequence of the success of interest-based accounts of distributional poli-
tics that the link between education and redistribution has received rather little theoretical
attention. In light of a longstanding scholarly consensus that support for redistribution is
structured by economic self-interest (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983; Lipset, 1959;
Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Moene & Wallerstein, 2001, among many others), education is
assumed to shape redistribution preferences primarily through the effect it has on individ-
ual economic security. By increasing individual economic security, education encourages
a self-interested reduction in support for redistribution, and more conservative ideological
positioning on the left-right scale.
Of course, education does more than just structure economic interests. It also directly
shapes ideas, both in a top-down way, as a result of what is taught, and because education
constitutes a locus of socialization. Yet to the extent that education shapes redistribution
preferences independently of the material conditions with which it is associated, it is unclear
whether it should reinforce or temper anti-redistributive preferences.
On the one hand, education fosters non-economic ideas that are closely, causally linked
with support for redistribution. Through top-down processes that increase cognitive so-
phistication, and through bottom-up exposure to difference, education is expected to foster
norms of inclusion towards other races, cultures, and ways of life, and relatedly, social and
institutional trust. Trust and inclusion are closely associated with support for redistribution,
tempering the solidarity-eroding effect of individual economic security.
On the other hand, a more critical tradition in political sociology views education as a
conservative rather than a progressive ideational force. It draws attention to the status-
quo preserving ideas imparted top-down by elite educators. And instead of emphasizing how
bottom-up processes of educational socialization increase exposure to difference, it highlights
how concentrated privilege reinforces established power relations (Bourdieu & Passeron,
1977).
In this paper, we use data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) to
empirically disentangle the interest-based from the ideational effects of education on re-
distribution preferences. We present the results of an OLS analysis in which we draw on
interest-based theories of redistribution preferences to isolate the effect that education exerts
on support for redistribution through improved individual economic circumstances. We in-
terpret our results in light of associations between education and a range of attitudes closely
linked to redistribution preferences, as well as in light of a comparison between vocational
and university education. A quasi-experimental analysis based on non-parametric matching
reinforces our argument.
We find that net of individual economic circumstances, education is associated with less
support for redistribution, and it is university education in particular that produces this
outcome. University education is associated with more conservative redistribution prefer-
ences despite fostering sociopolitical trust and inclusive ideas closely linked with support for
redistribution.
Theoretically, the implications of our analysis are twofold. First, our argument implies
that theories of redistribution should take ideas more seriously than they currently do. In-
fluential accounts of welfare preferences have centered on the role of economic self-interest
and have not tried to separate the effect of education from the effect of economic security
on support for redistribution. Empirical work has followed suit, with a tendency to include
education only as a control for economic security. We show that the role of education in
providing economic security is only half the story when explaining support for redistribu-
tion. Of equal importance is education’s role in shaping ideas rather than interests through
a variety of top–down and bottom-up educational processes.
Second, our analysis suggests a need to qualify the prominent view that education is
a coherent force for progressive social change. We show that while it is indeed the case
that university encourages a range of progressive ideas related to cultural inclusivity, it
simultaneously encourages conservative redistribution preferences that are reinforced - but
only partly explained - by the economic security it tends to provide. In short, we suggest
that university education fosters norms of inclusion, while eroding norms of solidarity.
2 Education and political attitudes
There is a formidable scholarly consensus that support for redistribution – and more generally
the traditional ‘economic’ dimension of political conflict - is structured by the material self-
interest of different socioeconomic classes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983; Lipset, 1959)
or individuals (Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Moene & Wallerstein, 2001).
Education is seen to be relevant for explaining redistribution preferences primarily through
the effect it has on material self-interest. Education provides productive skills and labor mar-
ket signals that increase income and reduce economic insecurity (Cusack, Iversen, & Rehm,
2006; Marshall, 2019). Educated people are more likely to have higher incomes, less likely to
be unemployed, and more likely to have wealth to fall back on if they do face an interruption
in earnings (Tobias & Mingliang, 2004; Cutler, Huang & Lleras-Muney, 2015; Pteffer, 2018).
In short education reduces individual need for redistributive support from the state, and
correspondingly reduces demand for redistribution.
Yet education does more than simply to structure economic interests. In addition to
providing skills and signals that shape preferences by providing greater economic security,
education also directly shapes ideas about how the world is and ought to be. This occurs in
two different ways. One is top-down, as a result of what is taught by professors and teachers.
Another is bottom-up, the result of processes of socialization within educational institutions.
It is worth unpacking these two types of mechanism.
Education and Ideas of Inclusion. In terms of top-down ideational effects of education,
scholars have long highlighted the direct instilling within education systems of culturally
progressive or inclusive ideas (Dee, 2004; Lipset, 1959; Stubager, 2009). These ideas of
inclusion are commonly conceptualized as ‘liberal’, as opposed to ‘authoritarian’. They are
underpinned by an aversion to social hierarchies, and by a contrasting belief in the equal
right to individual freedom (Stubager, 2009). The equal right to individual freedom implies
tolerance of individual differences, and this tolerance in turn is associated with trust in
political institutions that safeguard the expression of these differences (Niemi & Junn, 1998).
A less overtly political top-down mechanism through which education shapes ideas re-
lates to the increased cognitive sophistication that results from the teaching and learning
process. In some ways, cognitive sophistication is ideologically neutral, enabling people to
develop policy preferences that more accurately reflect the circumstances they face. It re-
lates redistributive preferences more closely to the economic structure, and increases the
likelihood that those who stand to gain or lose from redistribution are aware that this is the
case (Bartels, 2005; Converse, 1964).
Less neutrally however, cognitive sophistication is also associated with ideas of inclusion
(Kitschelt, 1994; Lipset, 1959). Cognitive sophistication enables people to better understand
individual differences, reducing prejudice towards other races and cultures (Hagendoorn,
2018; Lipset, 1959), and increasing social trust (Hooghe, Marien, & de Vroome, 2012). By
supporting the understanding of abstract concepts and of complex causal processes, cognitive
sophistication also fosters trust in complex political institutions that protect minority rights
and individual freedoms (Hagendoorn, 2018; Lipset, 1959; Spruyt, 2014).
The inclusive ideas associated with top-down educational influences on how people think
are reinforced from the bottom-up, by processes of educational socialization. In particular,
education increases exposure to difference and to culturally liberal views from peers. Social-
ization within culturally diverse, liberal educational networks fosters trust in and tolerance of
other races, cultures, and ways of life (Hagendoorn, 2018; Newcomb, 1943; Sidanius, Levin,
& Van Laar, 2008), social trust more generally (Hall, 1999) and trust in liberal democratic
institutions (Nie et al., 1996).
Overall, a substantial body of theoretical work identifies top-down and bottom-up mech-
anisms that connect education with inclusive ideas and sociopolitical trust.1
Ideas of Inclusion and Support for Redistribution. Top-down and bottom-up ideational
mechanisms reinforce the interest-based effects that education has on certain political pref-
erences. For instance, inclusive ideas stemming from cognitive sophistication and exposure
to difference permit an appreciation of the cultural diversity related to European integration
and immigration. At the same time, higher skills and qualifications equip people to benefit
from the economic competition related to increased economic openness (Bovens & Wille,
2010; Cavaille & Marschall, 2019; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Hakhverdian, Elsas, Van Der
Brug, & Kuhn, 2013; Häusermann & Kriesi, 2011).
Unlike preferences regarding European integration and immigration that clearly relate
to both cultural and economic concerns, redistribution preferences are usually placed on a
left-right dimension of political conflict relating solely to economic considerations. Yet there
are substantial reasons to believe that support for redistribution is not independent of the
cultural inclusivity and trust that education fosters.
In particular, racially inclusive ideas associated with education are expected to facili-
tate the social affinity that underpins support for redistribution (Wil Arts & John Gelissen,
2001; Kreisi, 2015), and conversely racial prejudice is associated with reduced support for
redistribution (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Roemer, Lee, & Van Der Straeten, 2008). Where
political elites supply nationalist policy options, the racial prejudice and mistrust associated
with lower education may manifest in welfare chauvinism, the opinion that immigrants are
less entitled to welfare benefits and services than the native population (Andersen & Bjørk-
lund, 1990; de Koster et al., 2012; Mewes & Mau, 2013; Van Oorschot et al., 2013). In the
absence however of welfare chauvinistic policy options, less education is simply associated
with lower support for redistributive spending, as migrants and racial minorities are seen as
key recipients of such spending (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Roemer et al., 2008).
1There is also noteworthy research that underscores each of these associations empirically, without theo-
rizing the causal mechanisms involved (see for example Bovens & Wille, 2010; Hooghe et al., 2012; Hyman
& Wright, 1979; Wagner & Zick, 1995).
Regarding social and political trust, recent work associates support for redistribution
with trust in the fairness and effectiveness of liberal democratic institutions (Rothstein,
Samanni, & Teorell, 2012; Svallfors, 2013). Conversely a lack of trust in liberal democratic
institutions manifests in reduced support for redistribution, because it erodes confidence in
the ability of governments fairly to redistribute resources (de Koster et al., 2012). The social
mistrust associated with lower levels of educational attainment is linked to reduced support
for political action in general and redistribution in particular, because it fuels the belief that
benefit recipients are undeserving of state support, and likely to misuse the welfare system
(Daniele & Geys, 2015; Hall, 1999).
To summarize the discussion so far, in addition to structuring economic interests, edu-
cation fosters ideas - both in a top-down way as a result of what is taught, and because it
constitutes a locus of socialization. Through both top-down and bottom up mechanisms,
education is expected to foster norms of cultural inclusion that reinforce skills-based cleav-
ages relating to cross-national economic openness. At the same time, these inclusive ideas
- and the social and institutional trust they support - are closely associated with support
for redistribution. They can be expected to temper the anti-redistributive attitudes that
education encourages by providing greater economic security.
Education and Ideas of Solidarity. A more critical tradition in political sociology views
both bottom-up processes of educational socialization and top-down processes of teaching
as conservative rather than progressive ideational forces. It draws attention to the status-
quo preserving ideas imparted top-down by elite educators, and instead of emphasizing
exposure to difference within bottom-up processes of educational socialization, it highlights
the concentration of privilege (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).
The view that anti-redistributive ideas are imparted top-down through the education
system receives qualified empirical support (Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991). Where faculty is
economically conservative, student support for redistribution is slightly reduced, but educa-
tors tend to hold progressive economic preferences (Gross & Fosse, 2012; Mendelberg et al.,
2017). Educational curricula can decrease support for redistribution by teaching ideas that
associate it with aggregate welfare losses, and indeed the study of social science subjects
is associated with lower support for redistribution (Mendelberg et al., 2017). Beyond indi-
vidual subjects, national educational systems can institutionalize individualistic educational
cultures within which erode support for redistribution, but they can also institutionalize
strong collectivist rationales for education likely to increase economic solidarity (Martin,
2018).
The view that anti-redistributive ideas are imparted bottom-up through processes of
educational socialization has also received recent attention. In an in-depth study, Mendelberg
et al (2017) show how affluent college campuses in the US foster anti-redistributive norms by
concentrating majorities of students from well-to-do family backgrounds. By emphasizing
the concentration of affluence rather than exposure to difference, Mendelberg et al show how
educational socialization can reduce support for redistribution rather than increase inclusive
ideas.
Overall, the highly educated tend to be economically better off and more secure, with
less to gain from redistribution. Yet to the extent that education shapes redistribution
preferences independently of the material conditions with which it is associated, it is unclear
whether it should reinforce or temper anti-redistributive preferences. On the one hand,
education fosters trust and inclusive ideas that are closely and causally linked with increased
support for redistribution. On the other hand, recent work suggests that affluent student
campuses and economically conservative ideas imparted by educators can erode economic
solidarity.
In what follows, we empirically test the effect of education on redistribution preferences
at the individual level. We expect that education should reduce support for redistribution
overall.2 But since the ideational effects of education are ambiguous, we control for (and
2We abstract from support for particularistic or universal benefits because the redistributive nature of
each of these types of benefit is not clear (Gelepithis, 2017; Korpi & Palme, 1998). We also abstract from
match on) economic security to test whether top-down and bottom-up educational processes
contribute to this reduction.
3 Empirical Analysis
We use data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS includes information about
socioeconomic status and sociopolitical attitudes, and is run biennially in about 35 countries.
Combining all eight available rounds of ESS data results in a large dataset (N = 366, 035)
spanning from 2002 to 2016. We limit our main analysis to respondents aged over 25 and
living in the EU15. In this way we drop those that are likely to be making ongoing educational
choices, and restrict our analysis to comparable institutional contexts. We relax the spatial
restriction in our robustness checks. Most of our analysis is based on an effective sample of
N = 194, 916.
We proxy support for redistribution in the usual way, with answers to the following
question:
[Redistribution]: Government should reduce differences in income levels. 1 (Agree
strongly); ... ; 5 (Disagree strongly).
3.1 Estimation
Denoting respondent i’s attitude on redistribution, we use the following repeated cross-
section specification:
Yi,t,c = α + βxi,c + γ′Zi,t,c + µc + φt + i,t,c.
In the above equation, α is the constant. xi,c ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy that takes the value
1 if respondent i at time t in country c has a university diploma (Bachelor or higher) and
other variables such as support for tax progressivity which are similarly ambiguous in their relationship to
support for redistribution (Berens & Gelepithis, 2018).
0 otherwise. Hence, β is the effect of education. To control for unobserved country hetero-
geneity, we include country fixed effects µc. Similarly, φt controls for survey round’s effects.
Finally, i,t,c is an idiosyncratic error term, with E [ |T,X, µ ] = 0. Finally, we weight obser-
vations using the design weights provided by the ESS to control for the relative likelihood
of each observation being sampled. The first model that we estimate (model i) is limited
to these controls. Zi,t,c summarizes individual-level characteristics. We organize individual-
level characteristics into 3 categories (demographics, income, and economic insecurity) as
follows.
Demographics. Since age is strongly correlated with political attitudes (Helliwell & Put-
nam, 1999) and educational attainment is difficult to compare across age cohorts, we control
for the age of respondents. To account for known non-linearities we also include age squared.
We control for gender, as it is associated with both educational attainment (in our sample,
the unconditional correlation between being female and highly educated is moderately pos-
itive, and political attitudes/behavior (see Pratto, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1997; Verba,
Burns, & Schlozman, 1997). In addition, as both political attitudes (Jennings, Stoker, &
Bowers, 2009) and educational attainments (Holmlund, Lindahl, & Plug, 2011) are affected
by family socialization, we control for parental education proxied by whether the respon-
dent’s father and mother hold a university degree (0-1). We refer to this set of covariates as
“Demographics”, and include them in models ii and iii.
Income. As education correlates strongly with income (ρ = .36 in our sample), economic
security, and higher living standards, we control for two income measures: net income decile
(1-10) and feeling of income (1-4). The former, objective measure does better in accounting
for relative income, but presents a high amount of possibly non-random missing data, as
the ‘refusal to report’ may be more common among specific groups. The latter measure
is based on the following survey item: ‘Feeling about household’s income nowadays: (1)
Living comfortably on present income [...] (4): Very difficult with present income’. While
subjective, this proxy has the advantage of partly accounting for household wealth, and
failure to respond is more limited. We label these covariates “Income”, and include them in
model iv.
Economic Insecurity. Political attitudes are shaped not only by low income and eco-
nomic hardship, but also by the risk of low income and economic hardship (Cusack et al.,
2006). Such risk is closely associated with education - higher education levels reduce the risk
of economic hardship and increase lifetime income (Rehm, 2011; Rueda and Idema, 2011).
To disentangle the effect of education from the effect of economic insecurity, we control for
three further measures. First, we control for relative skill specificity. We code relative skill
specificity following Cusack et al. (2006), and create a dummy variable at its median level.
Secondly, we control for whether respondents are labor market outsiders. Employment Pro-
tection Legislation (EPL) tends to be stronger - and the risk of unemployment consequently
lower - in standard than in atypical forms of employment (Rueda, 2005). In addition, in con-
tributory systems atypical employment is associated with lower levels of protection against
the risks of ill-health or old age (Emmenegger, Häusermann, Palier, & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012;
Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 2000). Taken together, the unemployed and those on atypical
employment contracts may be seen as labor market outsiders, and contrasted to those with
secure jobs, the insiders (Rueda, 2005). Although the categories of insider and outsider
cut across skill level and skill specificity (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2006;
Schwander & Häusermann, 2013: 252), they are distinctive in terms of the risk of economic
hardship with which they are associated. To distinguish labor market insiders from out-
siders, we rely on two objective measures. We create a dummy taking the value of one if
the respondent is currently unemployed, employed fixed-term, or employed part-time. We
also include a binary measure of long-run unemployment (any period of unemployment and
job-seeking lasting 12 months or more). We refer to this set of covariates as “Labor market
insecurity”, and include them in model v.
Though we restrict our main analyses to socioeconomic covariates, in an augmented model
we test for the possibility that other attitudes may - as omitted variables - account for a
large part of the observed effects. We include two key attitudes: left-right self-placement
(0-10) and political interest (1-4). These attitudes may crystallize through the university
experience, and they correlate with redistribution. Typically, left-wing individuals are more
supportive of redistribution than right-wing individuals, though the effect is nonlinear. Po-
litical interest may contribute to the decision to study at university, and may systematically
shape attitudes towards redistribution by increasing information (e.g. about existing poli-
cies and their effects). Finally, we control for religious beliefs (0-1). We refer to this set of
covariates as “Ideological attitudes”, and include them in model vi.
In a final model (model vii) we propose an alternative specification. Ideally, testing the
causal effect of education requires that higher education be randomly assigned to control
and treatment groups that are otherwise identical. In the absence of a full-scale randomized
experiment, matching techniques can be used within an observational study to mimic the
experimental method. Matching techniques date back to the attempts of Rubin (1973) and
Hollande (1986) to address the issue of causality in observational studies. The basic idea
is simple and powerful: to match untreated (low-educated) observations that are equal on
relevant covariates, with treated (high-educated) observations. The underlying logic is that
comparing individuals who are equal across all relevant covariates and only differ on the
treatment variable is logically equivalent to comparing individuals randomly assigned to
different treatments in an experiment (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002).
Whenever treatment and control groups are unbalanced, a simple regression model pro-
duces non-valid estimates of the average causal treatment effect. When there is some overlap
between the control and treated group, the estimates of OLS or Logit models will not cap-
ture the effect of the treatment in non-overlapping segments of the data (Gelman & Hill,
2007). In the case of education, this problem can be severe (see Kam and Palmer (2011)
and Persson (2016) who implement similar strategies to analyze the effect of education on
political participation). As observed by Persson (2014), if the dataset lacks individuals from
low socioeconomic backgrounds who gain higher education and individuals from high socioe-
conomic backgrounds without higher education, the dataset lacks overlap. Our final model
therefore uses a matching procedure, trading off representativeness for internal validity.
4 Results
Table 1 reports our main results. For all columns, the dependent variable is the score in sup-
port of redistribution, which ranges from 1 (strong support for redistribution) to 5 (strong
opposition to redistribution). Positive (negative) coefficients in Table 1 therefore associate
independent variables with more conservative (progressive) attitudes towards redistribution.
All regressions incorporate time and country effects, and we relax the assumption of inde-
pendence of errors within countries. In all specifications except our matching model (model
vii), standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Column (i) in Table 1 reports the (uncontrolled) effect of university on support for re-
distribution. As expected, the sign of the coefficient is positive: having a university degree
correlates with more conservative redistribution preferences. The average difference between
individuals with or without a university diploma amounts to slightly more than 1/4. As the
unconditional average on the redistribution item is 2.09, we can say that having a diploma
decreases support for redistribution by about 12.5%. While the magnitude of the university
effect on redistribution preferences is sizable in light of the multifaceted nature of social atti-
tude formation, it is of limited explanatory value in the absence of controls for demographics,
income, economic security and socioeconomic background.
Column (ii) presents the results of the model that includes Demographics. Controlling
for age and gender does not substantially alter the main coefficient. A slightly stronger
reduction in the magnitude of the university effect can be observed once we account for
parental education. Indeed, having parents with university degrees captures part of the
overall university effect, with a university-educated dad exerting a conservative influence on
redistribution preferences that is five times greater than that of a university-educated mum.
Column (iii) presents the results of the model that controls for income, and hence for
the correlation between education and improved material circumstances. The magnitude
of the university effect is considerably reduced, as expected, shrinking to just over half of
the effect reported in column (ii) but remaining significant at p < .01. Adding controls
for economic insecurity in column (iv) produces changes in line with expectations. More
specific skills, labor market outsider status, and past experience of long-run unemployment
all increase support for redistribution. Yet the university effect remains. After isolating
the effect that education exerts on redistribution preferences through improved individual
economic circumstances, the university effect remains sizable, and significant at p < .01. Net
of its effect on material self-interest, university adds a ∼= 6% right-wing bias to redistribution
preferences. As a summary, we might say that being educated to university level entails a
12.5% reduction in support for redistribution, roughly half of which cannot be explained by
theoretically salient measures of material self-interest.
Column (vi) in Table 1 rules out the possibility that intermediate attitudes explain our
main findings. Finally, column (vii) reports the average treatment effect from the matching
specification, using the same controls as in model (vi) as ‘matching covariates’ (details in
appendix, see B.2.3). There is a large drop in the effective sample (39, 166 individuals are
pruned) due to the fact that some individuals in the treatment group (with a university
diploma) may not have a sufficiently good match in the control group (individuals without
a university diploma). The average treatment effect is unsurprisingly of lower magnitude,
but still sizable and significant at p < .01. If we use the full set of matching covariates of
model (vi) instead, the effective sample size reduces to 88, 088 and the estimated average
treatment effect goes up to .102, significant at p < .01 (standard error is .010).
Table 1: Effect of education on support for redistribution.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Redistribution:
(1) Support ; – ; (5) Oppose
University (0-1) .273 .258 .228 .119 .121 .141 .094
SE (.028) (.026) (.023) (.026) (.028) (.021) (.012)
Female (0-1) -.135 -.135 -.125 -.123 -.118
SE (.020) (.020) (.019) (.020) (.019)
Age (25-99) -.009 -.008 -.016 -.015 -.012
SE (.003) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Age squared .000 .000 .001 .001 .001
SE (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
University: Father (0-1) .132 .107 .108 .100
SE (.015) (.017) (.017) (.015)
University: Mother (0-1) .027 .028 .026 .037
SE (.015) (.015) (.016) (.013)
Household income (1-10) .042 .041 .035
SE (.005) (.005) (.004)
Subjective income (1-4) .120 .114 .103
SE (.013) (.012) (.012)
Relative skill specificity (0-1) -.046 -.042
SE (.010) (.010)
Labor market outsider (0-1) -.049 -.037
SE (.014) (.012)
Long-run unemployment (0-1) -.104 -.077
SE (.024) (.023)
Left-right scale (1-10) .108
SE (.012)
Political interest (1-4) .001
SE (.005)
Religion (0-1) -.031
SE (.027)
N.Obs 170,651 169,945 169,945 135,780 113,098 103,826 99,620
R-squared .10 .10 .11 .13 .13 .18 NA
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. For model vii, Nearest neighbor matching (Mahalanobis).
Exact matching is required on every dummy variable, plus country and round. For all other variables, distance-minimizing is
used instead. Bias-adjustment is included for each continuous and categorical variable. In OLS, standard errors are clustered
at country level in regressions. Source: ESS.
5 Digging deeper
In this section we dig a little deeper to inform interpretation of our main results. We
examine the associations between education and culturally inclusive attitudes that are closely
related to redistribution (subsection 5.1), we compare the effect of university education on
redistribution preferences with that of vocational education (5.2), and we summarize key
results from the further analysis presented in the appendix (5.3).
5.1 Education, inclusion and trust
Figure 1 plots the regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the following four
further survey items. These questions proxy attitudes that are identified by the literature
reviewed above as closely linked with redistributive preferences:
[Xenophobia]: Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants? 1 (En-
riched); ... ; 10 (Undermined).
[Racial Prejudice]: Some races or ethnic groups are born harder working . 0 (Disagree);
... ; 1 (Agree).
[Social Trust]: Most people can be trusted. 1 (Disagree); ... ; 10 (Agree)
[Political Trust]: Trust in country’s parliament. 1 (Not al all); ... ; 10 (Completely).
The plot confirms that, while university is associated with less solidaristic redistribution
preferences, it is associated with greater inclusivity and higher levels of trust. Having a
university degree makes individuals more likely to embrace the cultural diversity resulting
from immigration and express support for racial equality, and it increases both social trust
and trust in political institutions.
Figure 1: Education and liberal attitudes.
5.2 The significance of university
In our main analysis we proxy education with possession of a university degree. What is the
significance of this choice? Both university and vocational studies belong to the category of
tertiary education and improve economic circumstances over the life course, but they can be
expected to differ with respect to both bottom-up and top-down ideational processes.
While vocational education is technical and aimed at increasing particular labor market
skills, university education is more theoretical. Studying social science at university can
decrease support for redistribution by imparting causal ideas that associate it with aggregate
welfare losses. Indeed combining country-level ESS and Eurostat data, we find that the
greater the proportion of students studying social science at the tertiary level, the lower the
average support for redistribution (see appendix 7). This suggests that the effect of university
on redistribution preferences should be stronger than the effect of vocational training (always
holding economic security constant).3
We can also expect the negative effect of university on support for redistribution to
be stronger than that of vocational training if education reduces support for redistribution
through bottom-up processes of socialization. This is because European universities concen-
trate affluence to a much greater extent than vocational education does. From ESS data, we
3This is especially the case given that social sciences are overrepresented at the tertiary level compared
to other fields of study (Eurostat, 2015).
can see that those who have completed vocational training are raised in very different family
backgrounds on average from those who have completed university. They are about three
times less likely to have graduate fathers and about four times less likely to have graduate
mothers. Smaller but substantial differentials are observed when looking at parental income.
This pattern holds in each single western European country. Both bottom-up and top-down
processes identified by the literature as ideational mechanisms that can erode support for re-
distribution are therefore expected to operate within university rather than within vocational
education. So we expect that the negative effect of university on support for redistribution
should be stronger than that of vocational training, other things equal.
To test this expectation, we mimic a difference-in-difference approach in a no-experimental
setting. In particular, we run two simultaneous equations:
Yi,t,c = αU + βUxunii,t,c + γ′UZi,t,c + µc + φt + i,t,c
Yi,t,c = αV + βV xvoci,t,c + γ′VZi,t,c + µc + φt + i,t,c,
where the subscript “U” stands for university and “V ” stands for vocational. Using the same
econometric specification as in v, and allowing a single covariance matrix for the two OLS
regressions, we then use a Wald statistic to test - in a two sided test - whether (βU − βV ) 6= 0
against the alternative hypothesis, and report chi-square statistics.
Table 2 reports the regression outputs. For every single dependent variable, the university
effect is significantly larger (at least at p < .05 ) than the vocational effect. This means
that, in comparison with vocational training, university makes individuals more conservative
in the economic dimension and more liberal in the non-economic dimensions. Regarding
redistribution preferences (column (i)), the university effect almost doubles the vocational
effect (βU/βV ∼= 1.8).
Table 2: The significance of University. Vocational v. University studies.
Redistribution Xenophobia Racial Social Political
prejudice trust trust
V U V U V U V U V U
Diploma (0-1) .069 .133 -.585 -1.007 -.032 -.094 .316 .572 .383 .621
Std Error (.017) (.028) (.074) (.069) (.013) (.021) (.042) (.044) (.050) (.058)
N.obs 113,098 119,999 12,419 114,213 117,630
University - Vocational .064 -.423 -.062 .256 .238
χ2 4.61 45.51 8.14 24.10 17.70
Coefficients are obtained by running simultaneous regressions for each output variable, clustering standard errors at country level.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. For all regressions, model v in Table 1 was used. It must be noticed that the control
group is the same when the main dependent variable is “vocational” or “university” diploma. “V” (“U”) columns report the effect
of obtaining a vocational (university) diploma. We then test with a Wald two-sided test whether the output coefficients are equal
to each other, and report Chi-square statistics. All tests reveal a statistically significant difference at least at .p,.05. Source: ESS.
5.3 Further analysis and robustness
Beside printing descriptive statistics (see A), the appendix centers around potential endo-
geneity issues (B). To deal with potential reverse causality (B.1), we begin by replacing our
main independent variable with a continuous measure of educational attainment (years of
completed education) to mimic a regression discontinuity design and strengthen the internal
validity of the proposed causal link between education and support for redistribution. To
deal with potential omitted variable bias (B.2), we run additional regressions to better cap-
ture the potentially confounding roles of parental background and political attitudes (B.2.1),
as well as expectations about income over the life-course, constructed following Rueda et al
(2014) (see B.2.2). We also discuss potential measurement errors (B.3), and show that our
main outcome is robust to the use of an alternative dependent variable as well as to non-
linear regression models which may provide a better fit in light of a rather non-linear data
generating process. Finally, we disaggregate our analysis by country to show the main results
are not driven by outliers (see C).
6 Discussion
Theory leads us to expect that redistribution preferences are shaped by material self-interest,
and our results are consistent with this canon. Yet we also find that education substantially
decreases support for redistribution independently of its effect on income and economic secu-
rity. It is of course exceedingly difficult to isolate economic self-interest motives for redistribu-
tion, and we recognize that our models do so only imperfectly. Nevertheless, the magnitude
and robustness of what is left unexplained after controlling for the best theory-guided proxies
for economic security is striking. We are therefore quite confident that education reduces
economic solidarity not just by reducing expected net gains from redistribution, but also by
directly shaping ideas about redistribution.
When we consider the effect of education on other attitudes we find, in line with theo-
retical expectations, that independently of its effect on income and economic security, ed-
ucation fosters trust and inclusivity. Net of economic self-interest, education is associated
with greater political trust, greater social trust, and more positive views about immigrants
and racial minorities. Such views are in turn expected to increase economic solidarity, since
people are more likely to support redistribution if they do not mistrust their governments
and their fellow citizens, and if they don’t hold negative views about minority groups. Yet
we find that inclusive attitudes do not translate into economic solidarity. Education exerts a
conservative ideational effect on redistribution preferences, despite fostering inclusivity and
trust.
Education therefore seems to foster what Kymlica (2015) calls ‘neoliberal multicultural-
ism’ or ‘inclusion without solidarity’. The economic security, cognitive sophistication, and
exposure to difference associated with education act as mutually reinforcing progressive forces
on the non-economic issue dimension, encouraging multiculturalism and inclusion. Yet on
the economic dimension of distributive conflict, ideational processes within education com-
bine with the economic benefits of education to create a strong conservative force, eroding
solidarity and upholding skepticism of redistribution.
As we dig deeper into the ESS data, we find that it is not education in general, but
university in particular, that exerts this strong conservative effect on redistribution prefer-
ences. Our analysis in section 2 shows that, net of economic security, university education
makes people almost twice as conservative in their redistribution preferences as vocational
education does. And our supplementary analysis in B.1 shows that it is attainment of a
university degree that reduces support for redistribution net of economic security, rather
than a gradual increase in educational attainment over the years.
The university effect is consistent with both top-down and bottom-up ideational explana-
tions. The former draw attention to economically conservative ideas imparted by educators.
This may be through university social science curricula that reduce support for redistribu-
tion, possibly by teaching ideas that associate it with aggregate welfare losses. Or it may
be that beyond the social sciences, university teaching institutionalizes individualistic ed-
ucational cultures, similar to that of the Danish school system (Martin, 2018), according
to which redistribution is more likely to be seen as unjustly reducing deserved returns on
educational investments.
Bottom-up explanations instead emphasize how processes of educational socialization re-
duce support for redistribution by concentrating affluence and amplifying anti-redistributive
norms picked up from family socialization (Mendelberg et al., 2017). Such a mechanism
would also be consistent with our results, given the high concentration of affluent students
in university relative to vocational education, across our sample of European countries.
In sum, this paper departs from interest-based approaches to explaining redistribution
preferences to join a relatively small literature that emphasizes the explanatory importance
of ideas (Larsen, 2008; Oorschot, 2006; B. Rothstein, 1998; Scheve & Stasavage, 2016). It
develops the argument that in addition to affecting economic prospects, education has the
capacity to impart ideas top-down through the content of what is taught, and to shape ideas
from the bottom up through processes of educational socialization. Our main contribution is
to show that the role of education in providing skills and associated economic security is only
half the story when explaining support for redistribution. Of equal importance is education’s
role in shaping ideas rather than interests. Future research might aim to disentangle the
bottom-up and top-down ideational processes identified in this paper, to better understand
just what is happening at European universities to foster norms of cultural inclusion while
simultaneously eroding norms of economic solidarity.
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A Descriptive statistics
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Redistribution 171,551 2.180 1.052 1 5
Xenophobia 169,165 5.717 2.515 1 10
Racist prejudice 20,384 .409 .492 0 1
Social trust 174,239 5.246 2.393 1 10
Political trust 170,782 4.688 2.483 1 10
University 174,233 0.251 0.434 0 1
Female 174,451 1.532 0.499 1 2
Age 173,748 52.33 16.28 25 123
University: Father 174,591 0.0620 0.241 0 1
University: Mother 174,591 0.105 0.307 0 1
Immigration: Father 173,867 1.120 0.325 1 2
Immigration: Mother 174,283 1.118 0.322 1 2
Household income 139,912 5.830 2.642 1 10
Subjective income 170,678 1.905 0.827 1 4
Long-run unemployment 174,141 0.134 0.340 0 1
Labor market outsider 174,591 0.360 0.480 0 1
Relative skill specificity 150,545 0.272 0.445 0 1
Religion 172,266 1.389 0.488 1 2
Political Interest 174,281 2.522 0.926 1 4
Left right scale 157,176 5.056 2.092 0 10
B Endogeneity issues
Throughout the paper, we analyze the association between educational attainment and re-
distribution preferences, positing a causal relationship between the two. Well aware that the
challenge of causality can not be entirely overcome, we address the standard endogeneity
issues: reverse causality, omitted variable bias, and measurement errors.
B.1 Reverse causality
What if educational choices be affected by beliefs about the role of government? Even if
educational choices are irreversible whereas attitudes are malleable, and even if educational
choices are undertaken at early stages of life, attitudes towards the role of government
may partly affect the decision to go to university. We may conjecture, for instance, that
a teenager with strong opposition to redistribution may be more likely, ceteris paribus, to
acquire human capital so as to reduce her future expected reliance on welfare. Similarly,
we may conjecture that a teenager with strong interest towards societal issues may be more
likely, ceteris paribus, to enroll in a bachelor degree so as to deepen her understanding of the
role of government. It is not our objective to dismiss the possible relevance of this reverse
causal channel. Rather, we provide additional arguments and analysis that further validate
our causal channel.
Our analysis suggests that university reduces support for redistribution. If university
matters per se, we should be able to observe a discernible effect of university on preferences
at the time when the university diploma is obtained. This would allow us to rule out the
possibility that education only shapes preferences gradually. We try to address this identifi-
cation threat by relying on a classic regression discontinuity design approach (Thistlethwaite
and Campbell, 1960).
Crucial to this design is the availability of a variable that throughout all rounds of the
ESS tells us how many years of education respondents have completed. Denoting the latter,
“forcing” variable by Ai,c,t, where the same subscripts as usual apply, we run:
Yi,t,c = α + β1xi,t,c + β2Ai,c + β3
(
xi,c × Ai,c
)
+ γ′Zi,t,c + µc + φt + i,t,c.
A couple of caveats are worth a mention. Firstly, while the discontinuity is set in a rather
sharp way, we have no information about the exact number of years that each individual had
to incur on in order to successfully complete her university diploma. We set this discontinuity
at 15 years, as this is the norm in most countries, but we acknowledge that the choice is
somewhat arbitrary. Hence, we run a sharp RDD design with rather fuzzy data. We are
interested in controlling for the effects that education has though top-down or bottom-up
ideational processes, rather than in demonstrating that the attainment of the university
diploma makes a difference.
Results in Table 3 are key to our analysis. Column (i) simply reports the university-
effect from the main specification (model v in Table 1). Column (ii) and column (iii) add,
progressively, (ii) the forcing variable and (iii) the interaction of the forcing variable with
the university dummy. Table 3 shows that the university effects decreases. It now adds a
5% right-wing bias in redistribution preferences. This small reduction, however, does not
threaten significance. Moreover, neither the forcing variable nor its interaction with the
university dummy are significant. Somewhat interestingly, the latter coefficient is negative
(though non-significant). It may hence be the case that further education (i.e, Master degree,
PhD) mitigates anti-redistributive preferences.
Table 3: Reverse Causality.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Redistribution:
(1) Support ; – ; (5) Oppose
University diploma (0-1) .130 .111 .113
Std Error (.026) (.025) (.025)
Years of education (0-30) .004 .006
Std Error (.002) (.036)
University diploma × Years of education -.005
Std Error (.005)
N.obs 121,265 120,857 120,857
Coefficients are obtained by OLS regression as specified in equation 2. Standard errors clustered
at country level are reported in parentheses. For i, ii, and iii, the set of controls is as in model v.
B.2 Omitted variable bias
In the paper, we relied on a large set of controls to minimize omitted-variable based endo-
geneity. Here we provide further analysis, extending even further the set of socioeconomic
controls, particularly in what concerns the confounding role of parental background and
the confounding role of future expected income. We also discuss in detail the matching
specification briefly discussed in the paper.
B.2.1 Strengthen controls for Parental background
The first and second columns in Table 4 simply report the regression coefficients in the Main
Table in the paper, to provide a benchmark. In column (iii), we run again the main regres-
sion after augmenting the set of controls that account for parental background by including
(i) maternal and paternal socioeconomic status, as well as (ii) maternal and paternal immi-
gration background. To create the first variable, we combine information from two separate
survey items. The first item is composed of two dummy variables, taking value 1 if the
mother (or father) were unemployed when the respondent was 14 years old. We consider
unemployment the lowest status, with value 0. Then, we exploit a categorical variable that
provides information about parental professional background. The survey item reads:
Father’s (Mother’s) occupation when respondent was 14 years old:
– Routine manual and service occupations;
– Semi-routine/ manual/ service occupation;
– Technical and craft occupations;
– Traditional professional occupations;
– Modern professional occupations;
– Clerical and intermediate occupations;
– Senior manager or administrators;
– Middle or junior managers.
The first three categories are given value 1, and correspond to an intermediate socioeconomic
status. The last 5 categories are coded as high socioeconomic status, with a value of 2. As
such, parental background is a variable ranging from 0 to 2, where 0 is unemployment, 1 is
blue-collar occupations, and 2 is white collar occupations.
Column (iv) adds controls related to income and column (v) controls for economic inse-
curity. Finally, in column (vi), we run again the main regression after extending the set of
controls that account for the development of attitudes that may be related to the acquisition
of education and may in turn affect preferences for redistribution.
Table 4 reports the coefficients of our augmented regression. Comparing the education
effect on redistribution preferences in Table 4 with those found in Table 2 reveals that our
analysis is extremely robust to the introduction of both further socioeconomic variables and
further attitudes. It is of interest to remark that parental socioeconomic status presents the
same gender bias observed in the paper, that is, father’s status matters whereas mother’s
status does not. Immigration background, instead, does not affect preferences for redistri-
bution. Finally introducing satisfaction for democracy entails minimal effects on the overall
education effect. For each specification, the negative effect of education on redistribution
preferences is significant at p < .01.
B.2.2 Controlling for future expected income
Higher education may affect expectations about future income. In turn, expecting a higher
future income may reduce current support for redistribution. As such, educated survey
respondents may ceteris paribus support a lower level of redistribution because they expect
their income to rise. This represents an additional potential omitted variable bias.
Following Rueda et al (2014), we reconstruct income expectations based on the labor
economics literature on life-cycle profiles. They can be estimated in a relatively simple way,
following three steps. Firstly, we assume that income at any time is a function of skill
development (proxied by years of education) as well as professional experience (proxied by
the number of years of professional experience). Secondly, controlling for country and time
effects, we run
yi,t,c = α + β1 × skillsi,t,c + β2 × experiencei,t,c + β3
(
experiencei,t,c
)2
+ µc + φt + i,t,c.
and store the estimated values of βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3. Finally, we calculate expected future earnings up
to the retirement age of 65 abstracting from future income discounting. We then add yˆi,t,c as
a control variable in the main specification. Table 5 shows that higher income expectations
decrease support for redistribution for each specification. However, the overall effect of
education on redistribution preferences stays similar.
B.2.3 Matching to increase sample overlapping
Ideally, testing the causal effect of education requires that higher education be randomly
assigned to control and treatment groups that are otherwise identical. In the absence of a
full-scale randomized experiment, matching techniques can be used within an observational
study to mimic the experimental method. Matching techniques date back to the attempts of
Rubin (1973) and Hollande (1986) to address the issue of causality in observational studies.
The basic idea is simple and powerful: to match untreated (low-educated) observations that
are equal on relevant covariates, with treated (high-educated) observations. The underlying
logic is that comparing individuals who are equal across all relevant covariates and only differ
on the treatment variable is logically equivalent to comparing individuals randomly assigned
to different treatments in an experiment (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002).
When treatment and control groups are unbalanced a simple regression model produces
non-valid estimates of the average causal treatment effect. When there is some overlap
between the control and treated group, the estimates of OLS or Logit models will not capture
the effect of the treatment in non-overlapping segments of the data (Gelman & Hill, 2007).
In the case of education, this problem can be severe (see Kam and Palmer (2011) and
Persson (2016) who implement similar strategies to analyze the effect of education on political
participation). As observed by Persson (2014), if the dataset lacks individuals with a low
SES family background who gain higher education and individuals from high SES family
backgrounds without higher education, the dataset lacks overlap. Our final model therefore
uses a matching procedure to test H2, trading off representativeness for internal validity.
Matching estimators are based on the potential-outcome model, in which each individual
has a well-defined outcome for each treatment level. In the binary-treatment potential-
outcome model, y1 is the potential outcome obtained by an individual if given treatment
level 1 and y0 is the potential outcome obtained by each individual i if given treatment-level
0.
The problem posed by the potential-outcome model is that only y1 or y0 is observed,
never both. y0i and y1i are realizations of the random variables y0 and y1, with i subscripts
denoting realizations of the corresponding, unsubscripted random variables. ATE is then
computed as
τ1 = E (y1−y0)
More formally, consider the vector of covariates Xi = {xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,p} for observation i
(abusing notation, we abstract from clustering and time dimensions). The distance between
xi and xj is parameterized by the vector norm
‖xi − xj‖S =
{
(xi − xj)′ S−1 (xi − xj)
}1/2
where S is a given symmetric, positive-definite matrix. We find that the set of nearest-
neighbor indices for observation i, restricted to one in our case unless ties apply, is
Ωxm (i) =
{
j1, j2, ...., jmi |tjk = 1− ti, ‖xi − xjk‖S < ‖xi − xl‖S , tl = 1− ti, l 6= jk
}
,
where hence m = 1 and where the metric chosen for the scaling matrix S is the Malhanobis
distance.
Table 4: Omitted variable bias: Increasing controls.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Redistribution:
(1) Support ; – ; (5) Oppose
University (0-1) .273 .258 .118 .120 .120 .135
SE (.028) (.026) (.024) (.026) (.028) (.021)
Female (0-1) -.135 -.137 -.127 -.121 -.114
SE (.020) (.020) (.019) (.020) (.020)
Age (25-99) -.009 -.008 -.016 -.014 -.010
SE (.003) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Age squared .000 .000 .000 .000 .001
SE (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
University: Father (0-1) .137 .109 .110 .098
SE (.014) (.016) (.016) (.013)
University: Mother (0-1) .034 .034 .031 .036
SE (.017) (.017) (.018) (.015)
Socioeconomic status: Father (0-1) .046 .045 .040 .021
SE (.016) (.007) (.007) (.005)
Socioeconomic status: Mother (0-1) .031 .045 .030 .000
SE (.019) (.028) (.016) (.017)
Immigration: Father (0-1) -.013 .016 .013 .019
SE (.017) (.019) (.022) (.022)
Immigration: Mother (0-1) -.024 .005 .018 .005
SE (.016) (.014) (.015) (.014)
Household income (1-10) .043 .040 .035
SE (.005) (.005) (.004)
Subjective income (1-4) .120 .115 .095
SE (.013) (.012) (.010)
Relative skill specificity (0-1) -.044 -.038
SE (.010) (.009)
Labor market outsider (0-1) -.045 -.033
SE (.012) (.010)
Long-run unemployment (0-1) -.100 -.070
SE (.023) (.020)
Left-right scale (1-10) .103
SE (.012)
Political interest (1-4) .007
SE (.005)
Religion (0-1) -.020
SE (.025)
Satisfaction for Democracy (1-10) .027
SE (.005)
N.Obs 170,651 169,945 130,952 130,952 109,214 99,181
R-squared .10 .10 .13 .13 .14 .18
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses after OLS estimation. Source ESS.
Table 5: Omitted variable bias: Considering future expected income.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Redistribution:
(1) Support ; – ; (5) Oppose
University (0-1) .273 .108 .110 .129
SE (.028) (.025) (.027) (.021)
Female (0-1) -.151 -.149 -.114
SE (.022) (.024) (.020)
Age (25-99) .004 .004 .006
SE (.003) (.003) (.003)
Age squared .000 .000 -.000
SE (.000) (.000) (.000)
University: Father (0-1) .094 .096 .090
SE (.017) (.016) (.013)
University: Mother (0-1) .019 .024 .033
SE (.015) (.015) (.014)
Future income .107 .097 .110
SE (.020) (.023) (.025)
Household income (1-10) .110 .104 .088
SE (.015) (.015) (.013)
Subjective income (1-4) .106 .100 .093
SE (.020) (.009) (.009)
Relative skill specificity (0-1) -.051 -.046
SE (.011) (.010)
Labor market outsider (0-1) -.052 -.036
SE (.014) (.012)
Long-run unemployment (0-1) -.104 -.078
SE (.024) (.024)
Left-right scale (1-10) .115
SE (.012)
Political interest (1-4) .000
SE (.006)
Religion (0-1) -.031
SE (.025)
N.Obs 170,651 101,822 86,599 79,546
R-squared .10 .13 .14 .18
Country effects yes yes yes yes
Time effects yes yes yes yes
Standard errors clustered at country level reported in parentheses after OLS estimation. Source ESS.
B.3 Measurement errors
We identify two potential measurement errors that may jeopardize the validity of our esti-
mates. Firstly, while we treat our dependent variable as a continuous one, it is actually an
ordered one. A non-linear model may therefore provide a better fit to the true underlying
data-generating process. In this regards, we fit model vi in Table 2 through an Ordered logit.
Table 6 shows that the coefficient of main interest is positive and significant at p < .01, ruling
out the possibility that the main result is upward biased by OLS.
Secondly, we rely on a specific measure of redistribution preferences that respondents
may understand differently depending on their level of education. For robustness, we select
another proxy relating to redistribution. It reads:
[Fairness] For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small . (1): Agree,
... , (5): Disagree.
The effect of education on this alternative dependent variable coefficient is reported in column
(ii). The effect of education using this alternative dependent variable is close as the one
reported in the main text.
Table 6: Measurement issues.
(i) (ii)
Redistribution Fairness
Ordered Logit OLS
(1) Support ; – ; (5) Oppose (1) Support ; – ; (5) Oppose
University (0-1) .266 .039
Std Error (.015) (.014)
N.obs 103,826 25,755
Standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parentheses. Source: ESS.
C Conditional effects
C.1 Cross-country comparison
The relationship between education and support for redistribution does not hide large het-
erogeneity at the country level. Figure 2 ranks the EU-15 according to the strength of the
education effect on support for redistribution. The figure plots coefficients and 95% confi-
dence intervals. It shows that the education effect is positive and significant at p < .05 in 12
countries, amounting 80% of the sample. It is positive and significant at p < .1 in the UK,
while it is non significant in Italy and Denmark.
We can see that the extent to which education - net of economic security - reduces
support for redistribution does not correspond to established institutional typologies such
as the ‘three worlds’ of welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990) or the ‘four worlds’
of education finance (Garritzmann, 2016). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
explore how institutional context affects the relationship between education and support for
redistribution, disaggregating our analysis shows that our main result is surprisingly regular
across countries, and not driven by outliers.
C.2 Fields of studies
The ESS does not provide information about subjects studied, and even at the country-level
the necessary information is extremely scant. We download data from Eurostat on enrollment
by field of study, and create attitudinal scores on the dependent variable ‘redistribution’ by
collapsing ESS data at the country-year. Our dependent variable is thus ‘redistribution’ at
the country-year level. Our main independent variable is the share of the population enrolled
in any of the following fields: Economics, Finance, banking and insurance, Management and
administration, and Marketing and advertising. We control for the overall rate of enrollment
in tertiary education, GDP, GDP growth, Population, R&D spending and Gini index. The
analysis is necessarily limited to N= 34. Table 7 shows that a higher rate of student enroll-
ment in any of the aforementioned fields decreases support for redistribution. The result is
significant for most specifications. However, as the erratic evolution of regression coefficients
printed in Table 7 signals, the statistical power is rather limited, and results should be taken
with caution.
Figure 2: A comparative look: Education and redistribution, by country.
Table 7: Effect of business and economic studies on redistribution.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Redistribution:
(1) Support ; – ; (5) Oppose
Share of business graduates .005 .111 .211 2.184
SE (.102) (.054) (.115) (.289)
GDP 1.054 2.828 -14.395
SE (.032) (.928) (2.684)
GDP growth .024 .071 .848
SE (.036) (.056) (.104)
Population 3.604 -17.281 -236
SE (2.752) (7.561) (29.838)
Gini index .036 -.291
SE (.124) (.093)
R&D spending .339 -1.682
SE (.189) (.330)
ESS Share of graduates 3.585
SE (.288)
Gender gap in employment 6.389
SE (.458)
N.Obs 37 34 29 29
Country effects yes yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes yes yes
Standard errors reported in parentheses after GLM estimation. Source ESS and OECD.
